7.2.1. Introduction

This section of the Array EIA Scoping Report identifies the elements of shipping and navigation relevant to the Array and considers the scope of assessment on shipping and navigation receptors from the construction, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning of the Array.

7.2.2. Study Area

The assessment within this chapter has been undertaken within a study area defined as a 10 nm buffer of the site boundary as presented in Figure 7.3 Open ▸ (hereafter referred to as the shipping and navigation study area). This is an industry standard buffer (i.e. typically used in publicly available Navigation Risk Assessments (NRA)) used for shipping and navigation assessments as it captures relevant routeing in the area that may be affected, whilst remaining site-specific to the wind turbines, offshore substation platform(s), and inter-array cables associated with the Array.
Where appropriate, features outside of the shipping and navigation study area will be considered in the NRA, such as in relation to navigational features beyond 10 nm that impact routeing within the shipping and navigation study area and the cumulative screening of other offshore developments, which will consider offshore wind farms up to 50 nm from the site boundary.

Figure 7.3: Overview of the Shipping and Navigation Study Area

7.2.3. Baseline Environment

This section establishes the baseline environment in terms of key navigational features, vessel traffic and marine incidents for the purposes of identifying impacts which should be scoped into the Array EIA Report.

Data sources

The data sources that have been used to inform the shipping and navigation section of this Scoping Report are presented in Table 7.5 Open ▸ .

Table 7.5: Summary of Datasets Used for the Shipping and Navigation Baseline

Title	Source	Year	Author
Automatic Identification System (AIS) data for the period 13 – 26 January 2022 and 8 – 21 July 2022	Anatec Ltd	2022	Anatec Ltd
United Kingdom Hydrography Office (UKHO) Admiralty Charts 273, 278, 1407 and 1409	UKHO	2022	UKHO
Admiralty Sailing Directions North Sea (West) Pilot	UKHO	2021	UKHO
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) incident data	MAIB	2010 – 2019	MAIB
Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) incident data	RNLI	2010 – 2019	RNLI

Key navigational features

The key navigational features charted in proximity to the Array are presented in Figure 7.4 Open ▸ . The only features within the shipping and navigation study area are three charted wrecks, none of which are within the site boundary itself. The development area for the BW Catcher Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) unit is located approximately 15 nm to the east of the shipping and navigation study area, including the associated templates, anchors and chains. The closest oil and gas pipeline to the shipping and navigation study area passes approximately 10 nm to the south-east. Construction buoyage for the Seagreen Offshore Windfarm is located approximately 17 nm to the west of the shipping and navigation study area, noting that this is temporary and will be removed once the wind farm is in operation (expected to be operational in 2026); however, it is of relevance due to its current impact on vessel routeing in the area.

Vessel traffic

This section establishes the vessel traffic baseline based on the preliminary assessment of 28 days (13 – 26 January 2022 and 8 – 21 July 2022) of Automatic Identification System (AIS) data. Vessel traffic data consisting of AIS data, Radio Detection and Ranging (Radar) and visual observations from a dedicated survey vessel located on-site in December 2022 (collected) and summer 2023 (planned) will be used to inform the vessel traffic baseline in the NRA.
The 28 days of AIS data are presented in Figure 7.5 Open ▸ , colour coded by vessel type and have been selected to cover both a winter and summer seasonal period when comprehensive AIS data was available.
The majority of traffic within the shipping and navigation study area was recorded during the summer period, with an average of 12 unique vessels per day recorded during the 14 days, compared to an average of seven unique vessels per day recorded in winter. An average of two to three unique vessels per day were recorded passing through the site boundary itself during the entire 28-day period.
The most common vessel types recorded within the shipping and navigation study area were observed to be oil and gas vessels (42% of all vessels), cargo vessels (37%) and tankers (14%).
Oil and gas routeing was prevalent to the north of the site boundary, passing on a north-west-south-east bearing and associated with vessels transiting between Aberdeen (the UK), and oil and gas fields in the North Sea – including the BW Catcher FPSO. Cargo routeing was recorded predominately to the west of the site boundary and was composed of vessels transiting between Rotterdam (the Netherlands), and ports in the north of Scotland and Iceland. Cargo traffic included Roll-on/Roll-off (Ro-Ro) vessels operated by Smyril Line undergoing regular routeing between Rotterdam, Tórshavn (the Faroe Islands), and Þorlákshöfn (Iceland). Tanker routeing was recorded both on a northwest-southeast bearing through the site boundary transiting to/from Rotterdam, and on a northeast-southwest bearing to the north transiting to/from Grangemouth (UK).
Oil and gas vessel activity increased by 92% in the summer period compared to the winter period, with cargo vessel and tanker traffic 29% and 25% higher, respectively. All recreational vessels were recorded in the summer period, with only one passenger vessel transit recorded in the winter period – a Roll-on/Roll-off passenger (Ro-Pax) ferry that performs regular operations in Norway and was transiting from Ijmuiden (the Netherlands) to Stavanger (Norway). All passenger vessels recorded in the summer period were cruise liners.
Vessel traffic was assessed for potential anchoring based on speed and behaviour, as well as navigation status transmitted via AIS. Based on this assessment, there were no vessels likely at anchor within the shipping and navigation study area during either 14-day survey period. This may be expected based on the distance of the Array offshore.

Figure 7.4: Navigational Features in Proximity to the Array

Figure 7.5: 28 Days Vessel Traffic Data by Vessel Type

Marine incidents

Marine incident data assessed indicates that incident rates within the shipping and navigation study area are generally low. The Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) data indicated three incidents within the shipping and navigation study area over the ten-year period assessed, of which one was located within the site boundary. This incident occurred in 2016 and involved a fishing vessel that experienced machinery failure.
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) data indicated that six incidents occurred within the shipping and navigation study area, with three occurring within the site boundary itself. These incidents occurred in 2011, 2015 and 2018, with two commercial fishing vessels and a maintenance dredging vessel involved. Both fishing vessel incidents were accidents to person, whilst the maintenance dredging vessel incident was related to a floating object.

7.2.4. Potential Array Impacts

A list of all potential impacts on shipping and navigation which may occur during the construction, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning phases of the Array in the absence of designed in measures is included in Table 7.6 Open ▸ .

Table 7.6: Potential Impacts Identified for Shipping and Navigation in the Absence of Designed in Measures

Potential Impact	Justification
Construction
Increased vessel to vessel collision risk resulting from displacement (third party to third party)	Baseline vessel traffic data indicates that certain vessels are likely to deviate to pass around the Array, and as such collision risk in the region may increase. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered and quantitative modelling undertaken to assess the risk.
Increased vessel to vessel collision risk resulting from displacement (third party to Array vessels)	The increased levels of vessel traffic in the area associated with the construction of the Array may lead to increased collision risk (third party vessel to Array vessel).
Vessel to structure allision risk	The presence of surface structures will create new allision risk to vessels under power or Not Under Command (NUC). Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered and quantitative modelling undertaken to assess the risk.
Reduced access to local ports and harbours	Vessel transits and activities associated with the Array may impact access for third party vessels to local ports and harbours.
Operation and Maintenance
Increased vessel to vessel collision risk resulting from displacement (third party to third party)	Baseline vessel traffic data indicates that certain third party vessels are likely to deviate to pass around the Array, and as such collision risk in the region may increase. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered and quantitative modelling undertaken to assess the risk.
Increased vessel to vessel collision risk resulting from displacement (third party to Project vessel)	The increased levels of vessel traffic in the area associated with the operation and maintenance of the Array may lead to increased collision risk (third party vessel to Project vessel).
Vessel to structure allision risk	The presence of surface structures will create new allision risk to vessels under power or NUC. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered and quantitative modelling undertaken to assess the risk.
Reduced access to local ports and harbours	Project Vessel transits and activities may impact access to local ports and harbours.
Reduction of under keel clearance as a result of subsea infrastructure	The presence of subsea infrastructure (e.g. cable protection) may lead to an increase in under keel interaction risk. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered.
Anchor and fishing gear interaction with subsea cables (including dynamic cabling)	The presence of subsea cables may lead to an increase in anchor and fishing gear interaction risk. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered. This impact will be considered in the NRA in relation to navigation safety only.
Anchor and fishing gear interaction with mooring lines	The presence of mooring lines may lead to an increase in anchor and fishing gear interaction risk. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered.
Loss of station	In the event of mooring line failure, the floating structures would create a collision risk to passing traffic.
Interference with navigation, communications, and position-fixing equipment	The Array infrastructure (e.g. wind turbines, subsea cables) may impact equipment onboard vessels, including potential effects of electromagnetic interference from cables.
Reduction of Search and Rescue (SAR) capability	There may be an increase in incident rates associated with the Array which may lead to a reduction in SAR capability due to existing resources being required for additional SAR activities. The layout of the structures may also impact access for SAR responders in the area.
Decommissioning
Increased vessel to vessel collision risk resulting from displacement (third party to third party)	Baseline vessel traffic data indicates that certain vessels are likely to deviate to pass around the Array, and as such collision risk in the region may increase. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered and quantitative modelling undertaken to assess the risk.
Increased vessel to vessel collision risk resulting from displacement (third party to Project vessel)	The increased levels of vessel traffic in the area associated with the decommissioning of the Array may lead to increased collision risk (third party vessel to Project vessel).
Vessel to structure allision risk	The presence of surface structures will create new allision risk to vessels under power or NUC. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered and quantitative modelling undertaken to assess the risk.
Reduced access to local ports and harbours	Project vessel transits and activities may impact access to local ports.

7.2.5. Designed in Measures

The following designed in measures, and how these can reduce potential for impact, have been considered in the identification of potential impacts that have been scoped into the Array assessment ( Table 7.7 Open ▸ ).

Compliance with MGN 654 (MCA, 2021) and its annexes where applicable;
Development of, and adherence to, a Cable Plan (CaP). The CaP will confirm planned cable routing, burial, and any additional protection, and will set out methods for post-installation cable monitoring;
Development of, and adherence to, a Development Specification and Layout Plan (DSLP). The DSLP will confirm the layout and design parameters of the Array;
Development of, and adherence to, a Marine Pollution Contingency Plan (MPCP). The MPCP will identify potential sources of pollution, and associated spill response and reporting procedures;
Development of, and adherence to, a Navigation Safety Plan (NSP). The NSP will describe measures put in place by the Applicant related to navigational safety, including information on Safety Zones, charting, construction buoyage, temporary lighting and marking, and means of notification of Array activity to other sea users (e.g. via Notifications to Mariners);
Development of, and adherence to, a VMP. The VMP will confirm the types and numbers of vessels that will be engaged on the Array and consider vessel coordination, including indicative transit route planning;
Development of, and adherence to, a Lighting and Marking Plan (LMP). The LMP will confirm compliance with legal requirements with regards to shipping, navigation, and aviation lighting and marking;
Development of, and adherence to, an Emergency Response Cooperation Plan (ERCoP). The ERCoP will be prepared in line with MCA guidance and confirms the measures that the Array has in place to support emergency response;
Appropriate marking on United Kingdom Hydrographic Office UKHO Admiralty charts;
Promulgation of information as required (e.g. Notifications to Mariners, Kingfisher Bulletin);
Buoyed construction area in agreement with Northern Lighthouse Board (NLB) and described within the NSP;
Application for safety zones of up to 500 metres (m) during construction and periods of major maintenance;
Marine coordination and communication to manage Project vessel movements;
Compliance of Project vessels with international marine regulations as adopted by the Flag State, including the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) (International Maritime Organization (IMO), 1972/77) and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) (IMO, 1974);
Implementation and monitoring of cable protection (via burial, or external protection where adequate burial depth as identified via risk assessment is not feasible) with any damage, destruction or decay of cables notified to MCA, NLB, Kingfisher and UKHO no later than 24 hours after discovered;
Marking and lighting of the site in agreement with NLB and in line with International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) Recommendation O-139 (IALA, 2021a) and Guidance G1162 (IALA, 2021b);
Compliance with regulatory expectations on moorings and anchoring systems for floating wind and marine devices (HSE and MCA, 2017);
Blade clearance of at least 22 m above the water line, accounting for pitch and roll as per MGN 654; and
Guard vessel(s) as required by risk assessment.

7.2.6. Potential Impacts After the Implementation of Designed in Measures

The impacts that have been scoped into the Array assessment are outlined in Table 7.7 Open ▸ together with a description of any additional data collection (e.g. site-specific surveys) and/or supporting analyses (e.g. modelling) that will be required to enable a full assessment of the impacts.

Table 7.7: Impacts Proposed to be Scoped into the Array Assessment for Shipping and Navigation. Project Phase Refers to Construction (C), Operation and Maintenance (O) and Decommissioning (D) Phase of the Array

Impact	Project Phase			Justification (including consideration of embedded mitigation measures)	Data Collection and Analysis Required to Characterise the Baseline Environment for the EIA	Summary of Proposed Approach to Assessment
Impact	C	O	D			Summary of Proposed Approach to Assessment
Increased vessel to vessel collision risk resulting from displacement (third party to third party)	✓	✓	✓	Baseline vessel traffic data indicates that certain vessels are likely to deviate to pass around the Array or buoyed construction/decommissioning area, and as such collision risk in the area may increase. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered and quantitative modelling undertaken to assess the risk.	A dedicated vessel traffic survey will be undertaken to characterise vessel movements in the area.	Modelling of collision risk will be undertaken for the operation and maintenance phase. Any differences during construction will be discussed.
Increased vessel to vessel collision risk resulting from displacement (third party to Project vessel)	✓	✓	✓	The increased levels of vessel traffic in the area associated with the construction, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning of the Array may lead to increased collision risk (third party vessel to Project vessel).	A dedicated vessel traffic survey will be undertaken to characterise vessel movements in the area.	Qualitative assessment (informed by quantitative survey findings).
Vessel to structure allision risk	✓	✓	✓	The presence of surface structures will create new allision risk to vessels under power or NUC. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered and quantitative modelling undertaken to assess the risk.	A dedicated vessel traffic survey will be undertaken to characterise vessel movements in the area.	Modelling of allision risk will be undertaken for the operation and maintenance phase. Any differences during construction will be discussed in the EIA Report.
Reduced access to local ports and harbours	✓	✓	✓	Project vessel transits and activities may impact access to local ports and harbours.	A dedicated vessel traffic survey will be undertaken to characterise vessel movements in the area.	Qualitative assessment (informed by quantitative survey findings).
Reduction of under keel clearance as a result of subsea infrastructure		✓		The presence of subsea infrastructure (e.g. cable protection) may lead to an increase in under keel interaction risk. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered.	An assessment of the vessel traffic in proximity to the Array will be undertaken (AIS-only) and assessed against water depths within the Array to identify any areas where under-keel clearance may be of concern.	Qualitative assessment (informed by quantitative survey findings).
Anchor and fishing gear interaction with subsea cables(including dynamic cabling)		✓		The presence of subsea cables may lead to an increase in anchor and fishing gear interaction risk. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered.	An assessment of vessel traffic in proximity to the Array will be undertaken (AIS-only), including identification of areas where anchoring activity occurs frequently.	Qualitative assessment in relation to navigational safety (informed by quantitative survey findings).
Anchor and fishing gear interaction with mooring lines		✓		The presence of mooring lines may lead to an increase in anchor and fishing gear interaction risk. Non-AIS traffic will need to be considered.	A dedicated vessel traffic survey will be undertaken to characterise vessel movements in the area.	Qualitative assessment in relation to navigational safety (informed by quantitative survey findings).
Loss of station		✓		In the event of mooring line failure, the floating structures would create a collision risk to passing traffic.	A dedicated vessel traffic survey will be undertaken to characterise vessel movements in the area.	Qualitative assessment (informed by quantitative survey findings).
Interference with navigation, communications, and position-fixing equipment		✓		The Array infrastructure (e.g. wind turbines, subsea cables) may impact on equipment onboard vessels, including potential effects of electromagnetic interference from cables.	A dedicated vessel traffic survey will be undertaken to characterise vessel movements in the area.	Qualitative assessment (informed by quantitative survey findings).
Reduction of SAR capability		✓		There may be an increase in incident rates associated with the Array which may lead to a reduction in SAR capability due to existing resources being required for additional SAR activities. The layout of the structures may also impact access for SAR responders in the area.	Historical incident data will be assessed to characterise baseline incident rates.	Qualitative assessment (informed by quantitative baseline findings).

7.2.7. Proposed Approach to the Environmental Impact Assessment

The shipping and navigation EIA will apply the methodology set out in MGN 654 as required by the MCA. This methodology differs from the overarching methodology applied for other topics within the EIA Report (see section 4), as it is a requirement of the MCA under MGN 654 for assessment of shipping and navigation risk. Specific to the shipping and navigation EIA, the following guidance documents will also be considered:

MGN 654 Offshore Renewable Energy Installations (OREI): Guidance on UK Navigational Practice, Safety and Emergency Response (MCA, 2021);
Revised Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) (IMO, 2018);
IALA Guidance G1162 on the Marking of Man-Made Offshore Structures (IALA, 2021a and 2021b); Recommendation O-139 on the Marking of Man-Made Offshore Structures (IALA, 2021a);
The Royal Yachting Association’s (RYA) Position on Offshore Energy Developments: Paper 1 – Wind Energy (RYA, 2019a); and
Regulatory Expectations on Moorings for Floating Wind and Marine Devices (MCA and HSE, 2017).

As required under the MCA methodology (Annex 1 to MGN 654) (MCA, 2021), and in line with international marine risk assessment standards, the IMO FSA (IMO, 2018) approach will be applied for impact assessment. The FSA methodology is centred on risk control and assess each impact in terms of its frequency of occurrence and severity of consequence, in order that its significance be determined as either ‘broadly acceptable’, ‘tolerable’, or ‘unacceptable’, via a risk matrix as shown in Table 7.8 Open ▸ . Any impact assessed as ‘unacceptable’ will require additional mitigation measures implemented beyond those considered embedded to reduce the impact to within ‘tolerable’ or ‘broadly acceptable’ parameters and As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Any impacts found to be ‘unacceptable’ or ‘tolerable’ but not ALARP under the FSA are considered significant in EIA terms.

Table 7.8: IMO FSA Risk Matrix

	Severity of Consequence
Frequency of Consequence		Negligible	Minor	Moderate	Serious	Major
	Negligible	Broadly Acceptable	Broadly Acceptable	Broadly Acceptable	Broadly Acceptable	Tolerable
	Extremely Unlikely	Broadly Acceptable	Broadly Acceptable	Broadly Acceptable	Tolerable	Tolerable
	Remote	Broadly Acceptable	Broadly Acceptable	Tolerable	Tolerable	Unacceptable
	Reasonably Probable	Broadly Acceptable	Tolerable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	Unacceptable
	Frequent	Tolerable	Tolerable	Unacceptable	Unacceptable	Unacceptable

Severity and consequence will be determined by the NRA findings which will be based on various factors, including:

Quantitative modelling (via Anatec’s CollRisk software).
Output of the baseline assessment including vessel traffic surveys.
Consideration of embedded environmental measures in place.
Lessons learnt from other offshore wind farms.
Levels of stakeholder concern.
Output of consultation including a hazard workshop.

The NRA process will be informed via consultation with key shipping and navigation stakeholders. This is expected to include:

Dedicated key stakeholder meetings (e.g. MCA, NLB).
Regular operator outreach (i.e. consultation with regular users of the area based on the vessel traffic survey data).
Hazard workshop with local stakeholders.
Liaison via Fishing Liaison Officer (FLO) where appropriate.
Other consultation as directed by the NRA process.

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Tables ▼

7.2. Shipping and Navigation

7.2.1. Introduction

7.2.2. Study Area

7.2.3. Baseline Environment

Data sources

Key navigational features

Vessel traffic

Marine incidents

7.2.4. Potential Array Impacts

7.2.5. Designed in Measures

7.2.6. Potential Impacts After the Implementation of Designed in Measures

7.2.7. Proposed Approach to the Environmental Impact Assessment